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Introduction
Water -its quantity, quality and distribution -has several potential consequences for human well-being in a way that its connection with security and conflict has become a subject of growing concern globally. With the redefinition of security in the early 1980s to reflect non-traditional threats such as cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, the types and sources of threats are now wide-ranging (Lowi, 1999) .
Much research focusing on the nexus between environmental change and security argue over whether environmental issues should be considered as a type or source of threat to security (Gleditsch, 1998; Hauge and Ellingsten, 1998) . Some analysts claim that security has a militarised framework and including environmental issues as a security concern will be inappropriate strategically (Deudney, 1990) . Others suggest that changes to the natural environment constitute a potential security threat because security is essentially about the well-being of people, which is influenced by the degradation of natural resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999) . 1 A key issue linked to this argument is assessed in this paper by examining how water factors into conflicts based on an understanding of the relationships between environmental change, vulnerability and security. There are few studies that specifically link environmental change, vulnerability issues and security in the field of water resources and water conflict (Goulden et al., 2008) . Existing case studies concentrate on the Nile river basin and individual basins in the Middle East (e.g. Lowi, 1999) . To date, case study analyses on the Lake Chad basin are sorely lacking and yet concerns about relationships between water and conflict in Lake Chad abound. The rate of hydrological changes in the basin is unprecedented. Between 1960 and 2000, the region where the lake is located experienced one of the most substantial and sustained reduction in rainfall events recorded anywhere in the world (IPCC, 2001) . In 2003, the Lake region was classified among the ten most water impoverished locations in the 1 The argument here is whether environmental issues (e.g. resource abundance or scarcity) should be considered as a source of threat to security. There are the 'yes' group -(e.g. Homer-Dixon (1999) in his scarcity conflict, resource capture and ecological marginalisation theory; Peluso and Watt (2001) who view the environment and the resources derived from it as a contested entitlement from the vantage point of political ecology; Le Billion (2001) in his resource abundance to conflict hypothesis especially about oil, diamonds and timber) and, the 'no' group -(e.g. Deudney (1990) who makes a case against linking environment to conflict/violence). Besides environmental issues there are several types/sources of threat to security, some of which Peluso and Watts (2001) pointed out to include historical events, social relations and political/economic policies related to resource control.
world (UNEP, 2003) . The impact of this on human systems has triggered large-scale social disruptions at various times in the past (Odada et al., 2006) . While growing numbers of riparian agencies and policy makers have voiced concerns over the security implications of the receding lake (FAO, 2009) , there is currently little effort to systematically analyse and understand how and why the receding Lake Chad connects with regional insecurity.
The aim of this paper is to provide a series of responses to a set of questions that often feature in debates in the environmental security research domain. The responses are framed specifically to reflect the challenges in Lake Chad. The questions are as follows: (Rijsberman, 2006) ) in a setting where decline in water supply is leading to several conflict outcomes, challenges us to conceptualise security beyond the traditional notions of protection from the consequences of external military threats or internal manipulation of governance or political order. In this sense, security is perceived as a non-traditional threat (i.e. water scarcity or degradation) requiring non-military responses (i.e. evidence-based policies) to mitigate actions (i.e. conflicts) caused by environmental change. The term 'environmental change' here refers to the contextspecific case of the Lake Chad basin in terms of decline in water quantity and quality following the shrinkage of the Lake Chad. The paper holds the notion that both climate variability and human activities can induce environmental changes which can influence the foundations of livelihood subsistence by reducing access to, and the quality of, the natural resources that support human well-being. In this way, environmental changes can affect regional security. A concern with regional security relates security to the well-being of individuals and communities in the four nations of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad -which constitute the Lake Chad region. Regional security is conceptualised as a condition whereby the Lake region has the option to respond to natural resource scarcity based threats to its environmental and socio-economic well-being.
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Though context-specific, this study offers detailed insights into the underlying complexities around how environmental changes and security connect in high risk regions, as well as advancing understanding of society's efforts to reduce its vulnerability to those changes.
Engaging with the literature on water and conflict
Fresh water has become an increasingly scarce resource in many parts of the world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where approximately one quarter of the population currently live in water-stressed villages and communities (Freitas, 2013) .
Because water is at the core of human existence, the literature about its connection with conflict is extensive. Major lines of research focus on scale dynamics by investigating water and conflict at trans-boundary/regional level (Wolf et al., 2003) and at local community level (Funder et al., 2012) . Another line of research explores the mechanisms behind water scarcity and conflict interactions (Frijters and Leenstyaar, 2003; Gehrig and Rogers, 2009 ). Other approaches focus on specific issues such as power relations (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Zeitoun and Allan, 2008; Stetter et al., 2011) , institutions (Tir and Stinnett, 2012) , violent versus nonviolent water conflict (Bernauer and Siegfried, 2012) and water conflict management (Hensel et al., 2006) .
A range of debates exist which provides insight into the possible ways in which water can drive conflict or cooperation. One strand of the literature reflected in a seminal study conducted by Wolf et al. (2003) adduces that instances of cooperation over shared water resources outnumbered incidences of conflict. This finding reinforced an earlier observation by Postel and Wolf (2001) where they noted that riparian countries have long signed water-related treaties to reduce competing claims and to promote cooperation over a water resource, its allocation and uses. These scholars present 2 We adopt the notion of regional security (in which human security is embedded) in the context of threats to human capabilities and well-being (see NNC, 2007) water as an important resource that functions more as a "connector" than as a "divider", and thus as a catalyst for unity and interdependence among people and nations.
A contrary view posits that given the increasingly scarce situation of fresh water, coupled with the lack of suitable substitute for most of its uses, a causal relationship exists between water scarcity and conflict. A large number of past and current studies promote this line of argument (e.g. Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; Bernauer and Siegfried, 2012; Kreamer, 2012) . Using case studies from the Middle East, South Asia and South America, Remans (1995) suggests that competition over scarce fresh water leads to severe social and political tensions. Butts (1997) noted that the Earth's history is replete with examples of water-related violent conflicts. Eriksson et al. (2003) Decline in water quantity or quality can trigger mass migration which could socially and politically destabilise destination states or cities (Carius et al., 2004) . Second, the importance of water in sustaining livelihoods, mostly agricultural livelihoods, provides a link to conflict (Conca, 2006) . Livelihood loss can lead to poverty, which is a traditional driver of conflict. Third, there are instances where power relations and inadequate water governance affect the potential for conflict, especially in settings where rivers flow across state boundaries and where institutions lack human, technical and administrative capacities (Gehrig and Rogers, 2009; Ludwig et al., 2011) .
Although the world is yet to record any example of countries going to war over water (Wolf et al., 2003) , the focus on cause-effect relations in this field has failed to frame water conflicts in a way that allows vulnerability to explain why the same environmental issue produces different effects across a range of different social, economic and political settings. Vulnerability, as used in this study, means the characteristics of a region, state or people and the situations that define and influence their capacity to adjust to, resist and recover from the impacts of environmental change, such as climate change or water degradation (Wisner et al., 2004) . Although vulnerability can have different definitions, it is usually approached from three key angles -exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (Smit and Wandel, 2006; IPCC, 2007) . Exposure is the presence of people, livelihood assets, environmental resources and infrastructure in locations that are predisposed to be adversely affected by an external shock or stress (IPCC-SREX, 2012) . Sensitivity is the degree of responsiveness to both problematic and beneficial stimuli resulting from environmental changes (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001 ). Adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust to internal or external changes, to moderate potential harms or take advantage of beneficial opportunities (IPCC, 2007) .
This paper recognises the lack of attention given to vulnerability thinking in linking water problems to social conflict as a key gap in water conflict literature. It therefore seeks to move the literature forward by including notions of vulnerability, particularly by outlining the role of vulnerability in explaining water-to-conflict pathways, rather than the conventional notions of water scarcity or abundance.
Lake Chad and its environment
Located in west-central Africa, Lake Chad's dynamic nature, as seen in its size, shape and depth, is constantly changing in response to variations in temperatures and rainfall.
A variety of ecological zones surround the Lake including deserts, forests, wetlands, savannas and mountains (Ovie and Emma, 2011) . Three main drainage systems supply its water: the Chari-Logone River (in the Central African Republic), the Komadugu-Yobe River (in Nigeria) and the Yedsaram/Ngadda River (in Cameroon). Lake Chad was identified in a study conducted by Wolf et al., (2003) as one of the Lakes at greatest risk of socio-political stress. Over 7 years since this observation, the state of the Lake's basin has worsened ( Figure 1 ) as it has shrunk by over 90 % compared with its size (25, 000 km 2 ) in the 1960s (Gao et al., 2011) . Lake's waters (Onuoha, 2008) . Between 1970 and 1990, the average water discharge 4 Lake Chad was vastly bigger (up to 400,000 km 2 ) several thousand years ago than it was in the 1960s, then it was known as Lake Megachad (Drake and Bristow, 2006) . For the entire 20 th century, the Lake was at its highest level between 1960 and 1963. This informs why discussions about the Lake's shrinking state often make reference to this period. from the Chari-Logone River to the basin was 55 % of the average of the period 1950 -1970 (Olivry et al., 1996 . It is estimated that about one-third of the water flow (since the 1980s) is diverted from the Chari-Logone River in Central African Republic before it reaches the Lake Basin (Glantz, 2004) . Water diversion for irrigation and hydropower generation increased greatly between 1981 and 1990 (GIWA, 2004 . About 50 % of the depletion in the Lake's size since the late 1970s to 2000 was attributed to unsustainable water diversion and use for human activities (Coe and Foley, 2001 ). The current state of the Lake is one of acute water shortage. In 2000 water supply was less than 500 m 3 per person per year (Henninger et al., 2000) ; this has not changed to date though population has continued to increase. A change from cultivation of low water intensity food crops (such as wheat) to high water intensity food crops (such as rice) has added to the water scarcity (Odada et al., 2006) . Reduced water levels have caused increased alkalinity, increased anoxic conditions and worsened the effects of eutrophication (Ovie and Emma, 2011) . Because the Lake region is generally and historically exposed to intense drought events, water scarcity is increasingly associated with the myriad of socioeconomic and livelihood shifts around the Lake, for which climate variability acts as an amplifier.
Method
To provide a comprehensive answer to the questions posed in this paper, we undertake a qualitative historical analysis of water-related conflicts (also vulnerability and security)
in Lake Chad. Our method is qualitative since the assessment of multi-scalar processes in linked water-to-conflict relations cannot coherently be undertaken through a quantitative analysis of correlations and/or regressions between supposedly 'dependent' variable -conflict, and 'independent' variables -water scarcity and other locationspecific factors (Selby and Hoffmann, 2014) . We focus on water conflict specifically because, of all environmental resources within the Lake, it is water which is most often linked to conflict. Water conflict is conceptualised in the words of OECD (2005) as "any conflict arising between two or more parties holding competing claims over a water resource, its allocation or its use." In this sense, we emphasis the spectrum of water conflict that stretches from non-violent expression of differences in opinion and value, through verbal assaults/heated arguments to deliberate contamination/pollution of water and to outbreak of violence (open competition, riots and aggression) within a regional scale (Stetter et al., 2011) . were used to provide additional insights about the role of the shrinking Lake in conflict.
Regional water conflicts -which include intrastate (household, village and community levels), interstate, bilateral, multilateral, armed or non-armed, were identified to coincide more with specific drought events (and less with non-drought events) for the periods 1970 to 2010. Thus, the study selected four periods/years during which the region witnessed severe droughts (i.e. 1972 -1975, 1982 -1985, 1989 -1992 and 2002 -2005) and situated them within Lake Chad socio-economic and political context of vulnerability and regional insecurity. 
Security and conflicts in Lake Chad
While there is no anticipation of any future large-scale war over water, past studies reveal that increasing water scarcity can induce regional tension and conflicts, drive border disputes and can be the focus of political arguments, tribal violence and crossborder terrorism (Kreamer, 2012) . The security concern referred to in this paper implies security in the wider sense of threats to human capabilities and well-being, driven by environmental changes through water resource degradation and scarcity. Much speculation about how water scarcity and the shrinking Lake Chad endanger regional security encompasses a variety of mechanisms. The importance of Lake Chad trans-boundary waters creates a situation where conditions in one country can create adverse repercussions in another. A river basin is a source of ecological interdependence under which water stress and conflicts in one country can be transmitted to another (Tir and Stinnett, 2012) . With climate change causing reduced rainfall, reduced river runoff and more frequent droughts, the extent and impacts of water scarcity are far reaching, particularly in the context of livelihood security.
A synthesis of literature reports on Lake Chad (Table 1) shows that there were increased water crises in the region during the droughts of the 1980s and 1990s. This period witnessed several militarised conflicts over competing river claims, especially as resource users migrated in response to the shrinking Lake. For example, between 1980 and 1994, almost 60,000 Nigerians followed the receding Lake waters; fishing, 5 Our interest is to identify whether drought events, i.e. periods of water scarcity lead to water conflict and how vulnerability is aiding it. Because the Lake region is historically prone to conflict, we recognise the likelihood of conflicts occurring during non-drought periods. However, since the paper is designed to better capture water conflicts using evidences within drought years over the course of the shrinking Lake Chad, we do no focus on non-drought years.
cultivating crops and rearing animals within Cameroon's border of the Lake Basin (Hall, 2009 nations sharing the Lake's common pool resources, the shrinking Lake threatens regional security.
As Table 1 indicates, between 1982 and 1985 interstate water and boundary conflicts increased among the riparian nations (Wallensteen and Margareta,1999; Odada et al., 2006; UCDP, 2008) . In 1982 local people from Cameroon and Nigeria clashed over access to the water resources around the south end border of the Lake Basin (Odada et al., 2006) . In 1983, Chad engaged in an interstate violent conflict with Nigeria over the status of the islands in the Lake to which both countries have borders (UCDP, 2008) . This violence resulted in over 100 casualties (Wallensteen and Margareta, 1999) . In the late 1980s, Nigeria and Niger Republic clashed over water diversion and access to the Komadugu-Yobe River flow within the Lake Basin. In 1992 there were clashes between upstream (Nigeria) and downstream (Niger) communities over access to the waters from the Tiga and Challawa Gorge dams at the south-west end of Lake Chad (Odada et al., 2006) .
Since 2005, inter-ethnic competition and conflicts over the use of resources within the Lake have continued to create security concern at the Lake's southern pool where the largest population of resource users live (GIWA, 2004) . Water shortages and loss of livelihood options have driven vulnerable people into risky behaviours such as drug trafficking and trading of arms. Ohlsson (2003) argued that large cohorts of young people deprived of their sources of livelihoods constitute the major share of terrorist groups/rebels in third world militias. The rising of violent jihadist militants, known as Boko haram, which has killed over 10,000 people in the Nigeria portion of the Lake (Northern Nigeria), has been linked to loss of livelihoods and joblessness created by environmental degradation around the Lake (Ifabiyi, 2013). As water scarcity and poverty become more amplified and intense, the economic and political value that communities and nations place on the Lake resources will increase.
Increase in unilateral consumption and unregulated allocation and use of water (e.g. through damming, diverting, dumping and draining activities) by one nation will decrease the amount available to another state. In the wake of the droughts and water shortages of the 1980s, each riparian country unilaterally took decisions to construct dams and divert water away from the Lake without recourse to existing water agreements and consultations with the LCBC (Onuoha, 2008) . This implies that previously agreed river diversion arrangements (e.g. for agriculture, human consumption and industrial use) are becoming politically problematic as rivers flowing into the basin continue to drop and as the resulting externalities become a burden for downstream countries (Odada et al., 2006) .
Environmental change, vulnerability and (in)security
One of the significant pathways by which environmental change influences security and induce social tensions and conflicts is through its impact on water scarcity and people's vulnerabilities or adaptive capacities (Ludwig et al., 2011) . There is now a substantial body of literature that focuses on the various determinants or drivers of vulnerability (Kelly and Adger, 2000) , how systems differ in their vulnerabilities (Ford and Smit, 2004; Adger, 2006) and what vulnerability issues to focus on when conducting vulnerability assessments (Smit and Wandel, 2006) . Whilst this literature offers useful directions on the different ways vulnerability can be approached, it is yet to expand to high risk, conflict-prone settings where research is able to link vulnerability issues with conflict to explain how vulnerability feeds into water and conflict interactions (Ludwig et al., 2011) .
Further, within the regional security context for river basins, an in-depth investigation of conflict-oriented vulnerability to water scarcity or degradation is needed to improve our understanding of how vulnerability to resource scarcity makes certain locations susceptible to insecurity.
We argue, as have others, that vulnerability to water scarcity can widen, rather than close, the water-to-conflict pathways, particularly in a region where sources of income and subsistence are declining and where people and societies lack capacities to adapt (Adger, 2006; Wisner, 2009; Fraser et al., 2011) . Embedding the notion of vulnerability in environmental security assessments provides a holistic insight into some of the multifaceted, interlinked variables in resource conflicts identified in Peluso and Watt (2001) . This insight emphasis that every state globally has its own specific vulnerability signature which defines the 'nature of the state' (Raleigh et al., 2014) , and on this basis, an argument can be processed on why the same environmental condition creates a range of different effects in different locations (spatial variation) and at different periods or seasons (temporal variation). In practical terms, what vulnerability thinking does is to point attention to why emphasis on resource scarcity or abundance is not a necessary or sufficient reason for conflict outbreaks (Le Billion, 2001 ) and why perspectives solely based on environmental determinism can lead to inferior policy suggestions. Situating water conflict within the context of location-specific vulnerability, where emphasis is on how people's vulnerability under environmental change leads to conflict, has therefore become a critical next step research focus in this field. Lake Chad and its riparian communities provide a breadth of conditions in support of this argument. The Lake region is highly vulnerable to many domestic and external shocks and stresses (Ovie and Emma, 2011) . This vulnerability is driven by factors which touch on the exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity of the region. An assessment of the vast body of literature that focused on the problems of Lake Chad identifies the drivers as climate change-induced water scarcity, high population density (≥100 person/m 2 ), low per capita GDP (≤ US$765 per person per year), poor/unfriendly relations, politically active minority ethnic groups, large dams and other water development projects and an absence of water allocation laws and treaties (Odada, et al., 2006) . These factors agree with the issues Yoff et al. (2003) identified as key drivers that predispose a lake or river basin to water insecurity.
To allow for a closer assessment, we have grouped these into climate, population dynamics and socio-economic-political conditions (Odada et al., 2006) . These factors cut across the entire Sahel, a region that is highly exposed and sensitive to harsh climatic conditions, and characterised by over-exploitation of natural resources, poor infrastructure, widespread poverty, high illiteracy rates, social conflicts, poor health care and high dependence on climate-sensitive livelihoods (Benjaminsen, 2012) .
Climate
This paper posits that the significant driver of environmental impacts on Lake Chad remains climatic variability and change. These influence the Lake on many fronts -by reducing the river flows that feed it, by driving the evaporation of its water and by inducing water quality changes through heavy precipitation of chemical elements (Ovie and Emma, 2011) . The climate of Lake Chad has been clearly highlighted earlier (see Section 3) but it is relevant to emphasise that while climate drives water quantity (supply) and distribution, population dynamics and socio-economic conditions (such as institutional development, water legislations and economic growth) are the principal factors affecting quality and demand (UNEP, 2005) . Where renewable water resources are less than 1000 m 3 /person/annum, water availability is considered to create a condition of discontent and desperation, especially when socio-economic development is constrained as a result (Gleick, 2008) .
Population dynamics
The human population dynamics around Lake Chad are driven by a southward migration trend following the collapse of the Lake's northern pool in the 1970s and 1980s (GIWA, 2004) . This trend has changed the Lake's demographic structure and created new production and development concerns. The population of the region is well over 30 million, growing at the rate of between 2.5 and 3.0 % annually (Hall, 2009) . There are over 70 ethnic groups around the Lake Ovie and Emma, 2011) , each exploiting the natural environment through a range of diverse activities. The dominant groups are the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri groups along the western shores of the Lake (Nigeria), the Mousgoun in Yaere (Cameroon) and the Sara and Kotoko in the Chari Delta (Chad). This population is predominantly rural, thriving on climate-sensitive agriculture-related activities.
Research has shown that rapid population growth under changing environmental conditions make resource users insecure and vulnerable to violence (GIWA, 2004) . For Lake Chad, vulnerability is shaped by a growing population that is pursuing similar resources at the same time; resources that are limited in their supply (Onuoha, 2008; Hall, 2009 ). The role played by ethnic heterogeneity in local resource conflicts in this region contributes to its population dynamics. Ethnic composition remains a crucial factor for mobilisation and turning protest into collective violence through the use of language and religion. In trying to make a living through exploitation of water and land resources, the multi-ethnic groups have often engaged in inter-ethnic and sectorial conflicts (Le Barbe and Lebel, 1997) . One particular instance is the recurrent clashes between the Shuwa Arabs from the east (of Lake Chad) and the Fulani pastoralists from the south west over the limited fishing and animal husbandry opportunities at the southern pool of the basin (Odada et al., 2006) .
Socioeconomic and political conditions
Socioeconomic conditions in this environment cut across a range of challenging issues.
The riparian countries are characterised by slow and unstable economic systems.
Poverty is acute and widespread. In the 2013 United Nation's Human Development report, Niger was ranked 186, Chad 184, Nigeria 153 and Cameroon 150 out of 186 countries globally (UNDP, 2013) . These countries face very low labour productivity, absence of a dynamic private sector, an oversized informal sector and inadequate infrastructure (GIWA, 2004) . Series of civil wars coupled with increases in military expenditures has further retarded economic progress, particularly in Chad and Niger (Hall, 2009 ).
The receding of the Lake has contributed to the dwindling fortune of the region. Before the current state, the Lake waters supported massive agricultural production: fishing, animal husbandry and growing of food crops (such as cotton, groundnut, cassava, millet, onions, rice, maize and sorghum) -which in turn supported the economy of the region (Odada et al., 2006) . Since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, agricultural production has continued to decline. For example, annual sorghum yield was less than 250,000 tonnes during the 1972 -1975 droughts and 180,000 tonnes during the 1982 -1985 (GIWA, 2004 . This has further declined to date (US Geological Survey, 2014).
Water shortages have initiated shifts in livelihood patterns. As the amount of grazing land for animals has decreased, herders in several locations have shifted from rearing grazing animals (cattle and camel) to browsing animals (sheep and goat) (Onuoha, 2008) . This practice has led to increased removal of vegetation cover (US Geological Survey, 2014) . In addition, with a declining annual fish catch (for example, annual fish catch from the Lake's fisheries decreased from 141,000 tonnes in the early 1970s to access open waters of the Lake to catch species of higher value. Only the wealthy fishing households are able to make these adjustments (Ovie and Emma, 2011) .
A combination of these varied economic conditions has affected the social and political space in the region which further creates severe implications for the riparian livelihoods.
Diminishing river flow has influenced inland transport (Ngatcha, 2009) , cutting off trade links, creating hostile neighbours and slowing down economic growth . The population lacks education, face limited employment opportunities, live under extreme weather conditions, exploit the environment in an unsustainable way, face food/nutrition insecurity, prone to numerous health challenges and lack access to credit facilities and adequate health care. Prevailing political instability and poverty inhibit the capacity of communities to initiate and implement viable adaptive strategies.
Lack of effective institutions, poor information network and absence of welfare support systems add to the burden in the area (Odada et al., 2006) . All these combine to explain why and how the people are vulnerable and consequently can enhance knowledge of the link between environmental change and conflict.
Synthesis: are environmental change, vulnerability and security issues linked?
Environmental change, vulnerability and security issues appear to be linked in this case study. Changes in the Lake's environment coupled with the vulnerability of the peoples and states have always been part of the security debates. While environmental change, as seen in climate-induce water scarcity and droughts for Lake Chad, does not constitute a sufficient cause of insecurity, how this change combines with the Lake Chad context-specific factors (climate, population, socio-economic and political factors) to either increase or decrease vulnerability provides a necessary condition for conflict to evolve and thrive. A shift in environmental conditions, either due to climate change or human activities, creates a lot of challenges for household and livelihood systems. A number of studies have indicated that in conflict settings, environmental factors tend to function more as triggers or intervening variables (Lowi, 1999) . For example, excessive flooding and prolonged droughts at certain times of the year in Lake Chad often combine to weaken communities that lack external supports and burdened by corrupt, insensitive leaders. However, it is possible to find situations in a developing world setting where environmental factors tend to go beyond just being the intervening variables to being part of the context of conflict. This can be the case where livelihood subsistence is heavily linked to the natural resource base.
We argue therefore that because the environment in Lake Chad is already vulnerable to a number of external shocks, this vulnerability adds up or combines with the vulnerability of the region in terms of its households and livelihoods, to create pathways leading to insecurity. This suggests that the linkage is more about the broader vulnerability of the region, which has been on the increase as climate becomes more chaotic and as a multitude of other context-specific factors threatens the survival and well-being of humans in the area (Figure 2 ). This synthesis posits that environmental and security concerns should be secondary to vulnerability concerns in a developing world context such as the Lake Chad region, because it is on the basis of vulnerability dynamics that we can better understand why locations facing the same environmental conditions are impacted differently. Much as the factors driving vulnerability in Lake Chad have been identified (earlier in this section), they combine to shape the link between environmental change(s), vulnerability and insecurity. Insight from this region supports conclusions from previous studies (e.g. Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Ludwig et al., 2011; UNEP, 2005 ) that the environment is connected to human well-being; that livelihood opportunities are linked to a stable environment; and that all of these are connected in one way or another to security. However, it is the presence of severe demographic factors, weak justice and poor resource governance mechanisms and arrangements for establishing rights of resource access and use that differentiate locations facing similar environmental challenge in terms of whether conflict happens or not. These factors are within the purview of vulnerability issues and support the notion that efforts to unpack regional vulnerability issues can be a critical first step towards addressing environmental and security challenges.
Pathways towards cooperation and human well-being
Enabling vulnerability assessment in the context of environmental change and conflict analysis can inform various institutional and policy interventions targeting social stability and peace building. Current military strategies by the riparian countries to contain insecurity in Lake Chad do not touch on the root causes of conflict, particularly the drivers of vulnerability. Non-military strategies such as the proposed water transfer from Congo River basin via the Ubangi River to recharge the Lake waters might increase livelihood opportunities if successfully implemented (LCBC, 2012). However, under weak institutional arrangements for efficient water allocation and use, rapid population growth and mass migration means that demand for water will increase and might further create conditions where vulnerability would encourage a closer linkage between environmental change and insecurity.
A key pathway to peace and human well-being therefore will be to reduce vulnerability in the region and enhance people's resilience with or without the Lake waters. Conflicts can be prevented by increasing the capacity of the people to both adapt and diversify beyond the current total reliance on environmental resources. To progress, states and communities must find ways to manage population growth, address migration, prevent unsustainable environmental practices (e.g. overgrazing and over fishing) and conserve and distribute resources in a manner that support human welfare. A robust water charter that promotes equity and justice should form part of the policy drive to create 'friendly' neighbourhood relations in the region.
The Lake Chad Basin Commission has the responsibility to work with stakeholders across the region to address sharing, conservation and management of the Lake resources and in engaging diplomatic options to resolve conflicts. Water may be scarce, but capacities to mitigate environmental constraints are not. However, for a variety of reasons ranging from insensitive, predatory governing structures to political conflict to terrorism to weak institutions, problem-solving scientific capacities have not yet been effectively mobilised to advance cooperation and security of peoples and communities.
Enhancing the capacity of the region awaits the right socio-economic and political context. If the creative capacities of local people are enhanced and efforts are made to develop the conditions that allow those capacities to be mobilised and deployed, then human welfare can be improved and future insecurity can be prevented. Institutional and policy inputs are required to create and sustain the pathways towards security.
Conclusion
To advance knowledge of water and conflict relations, this paper has highlighted the current debates in the water to conflict literature, examined the Lake Chad environment in terms of the significant hydrological challenges that confront it, and unpacked the insecurity trends in the region. It has identified why and how people in Lake Chad are vulnerable, whether environmental, vulnerability and security issues are linked and what this means in terms of both enabling vulnerability thinking into water conflict analysis and defining pathways towards human well-being.
The explanation for conflicts about water in Lake Chad lies not only with the natural environment or changes to it, but also with the underlying vulnerabilities that characterise the region. This paper identifies climate change, population growth and socio-economic-political deprivations as key drivers of vulnerability. These drivers combine with weak justice and resource governance mechanisms, absolute reliance of livelihoods on environmental resources and the activities of insurgent groups to shape the environment-vulnerability-security nexus, and to create conditions that make conflict inevitable. Our findings suggest that these factors explain why different locations facing the same environmental conditions can be affected differently.
While it is important to study the vulnerability component of conflict and security, this paper suggests that it is also important to study all components and their linkages from environmental conditions to conflict. It is with an appreciation of the underlying complexities and connecting events that pathways towards conflict prevention or resolution can be better identified and effectively implemented. Nonetheless, it will be totally misguided to focus attention on reducing people's vulnerability or addressing water scarcities alone, either in an effort to reduce or resolve Lake Chad regional insecurity. This is a critical perspective that future research agenda should embrace.
Further research needs to focus more on why and how the various connecting variables or components emerge; and how they thrive and combine to create potential avenues for conflict. The composition of institutions and how they relate with external shocks on the environment need to be examined to advance the capacity of institutions to create and sustain pathways towards the well-being of the region.
Finally, conflicts about water do not derive solely on whether water scarcity increases or decreases. More often than not, a combination of key drivers and mediating events play out in the pathways to conflict. For Lake Chad, reforms that cut across economic, political and institutional areas would greatly promote security and sustainable livelihoods.
